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Abstract
Introducing the minimal Maskin monotonic extension of a social choice
rule within some family of social choice rules, we dene a family of social
choice rules which certify to have a unique minimal Maskin monotonic ex-
tension of these social choice rules within this family. So we characterize
the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of q-Approval Fallback Bargain-
ing (Brams and Kilgour, 2001) and a social choice rule called q-approval rule
we introduce within the family.
Özet
Bir sosyal seçim kural¬n¬n baz¬ sosyal seçim kurallar¬ ailesi içindeki en
küçük Maskin monoton geni¸slemesi kavram¬n¬tan¬tarak, herhangibir sosyal
seçim kurallar¬n¬n sadece bir tane en küçük Maskin monoton geni¸slemesini
içeren sosyal seçim kurallar¬ ailesini tan¬ml¬yoruz. Böylece q-onay dönüs¸
pazarl¬¼g¬n¬n (Brams and Kilgour, 2001) ve bizim tan¬mlad¬¼g¬m¬z q-onay ku-
ral¬n¬n, baz¬ sosyal seçim kurallar¬ ailesindeki en küçük Maskin monoton
geni¸slemesini karakterize ediyoruz.
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Chapter 1
Preface
A monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary for
a social choice rule to be implementable via Nash equilibrium. However,
Maskin monotonicity is a strong condition. Many social choice rules are
not Maskin monotonic and therefore not Nash implementable. For example,
when indi¤erences are ruled out, no scoring rule (Erdem and Sanver 2005).
If indi¤erences are allowed then no Pareto optimal social choice rule (Sanver
2006) is Maskin monotonic. In particular, Muller and Satterthwaite (1977)
show that Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to dictatoriality when the social
choice rule is citizen sovereign and singleton-valued.
Sen (1995) proposes a method of evaluating the extent of non-monotonicity
of social choice functions, by extending them minimally to social choice cor-
respondences which are Maskin monotonic. A Maskin monotonic extension
of a social choice rule F is dened to be a Maskin monotonic social choice
correspondence which picks at every preference prole the alternatives that
F picks. The trivial social choice correspondence which always includes all
elements of the choice set in the outcome set is a Maskin monotonic exten-
sion of all social choice functions. It is known that the intersection of two
Maskin monotonic extensions of a social choice function is also a Maskin
monotonic extension of the social choice function. The intersection of all
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Maskin monotonic extensions is therefore also a Maskin monotonic extension
and is called the minimal Maskin monotonic extension of the social choice
function. Thomson (1999) studies minimal Maskin monotonic extensions in
economic environments by computing the minimal Maskin monotonic exten-
sions of certain well-known allocation rules. Kara and Sönmez (1996) apply
this concept to matching problems. Another application is by Erdem and
Sanver (2005) who compute minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of scoring
rules.
Two classes of social choice rules which fails Maskin monotonicity are
q-Approval Fallback Bargaining (Brams and Kilgour 2001) and q- approval
rule. For any xed number of q, where q lies between 1 and total number
of voters inclusive, q- approval rule picks the alternative(s) receiving the
support of q people at the highest possible level. And q-Approval Fallback
Bargaining picks the alternative(s) which gets the highest support among
the alternatives which are chosen by q- approval rule. We concentrate on
how to compute the minimal Maskin monotonic extension of q-Approval
Fallback Bargaining. We propose a minimal Maskin monotonic extension of
q-Approval Fallback Bargaining within a given family of social choice rules.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives the the notations and
denitions. Chapter 3 surveys some basic results on Maskin monotonicity
and Maskin monotonic extensions. Chapter 4, provides a short survey on q-
Approval Fallback Bargaining. Chapter 5, introduces the minimal Maskin
monotonic extension of q-Approval Fallback Bargaining within some family
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of social choice rules. Chapter 6 concludes.
3
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Given any two integers m;n  2, we consider a set of individuals N =
f1; 2; :::; ng confronting a set of alternatives A with #A = m. Writing  for
the set of complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations over A, we
attribute a preference Pi 2  to each i 2 N . We call P = (Pi)i2N 2 N a
preference prole.
Denition 2.1 A social choice rule (SCR) F : N  ! 2An f?g is a corre-
spondence from N into A, that it selects a non-empty subset of A for each
possible preference prole of the society.
Denition 2.2 The lower contour set L(x; Pi) of x 2 A at Pi 2  is dened
as L(x; Pi) = fy 2 A : x Pi yg.
Denition 2.3 The upper contour set U(x; Pi) of x 2 A at Pi 2  is dened
as U(x; Pi) = fy 2 A : y Pi xg:
Denition 2.4 Given any P , P 0 2 N, we say that P is an improvement
for x 2 A with respect to P 0 i¤ L(x; P 0i )  L(x; Pi) 8i 2 N .
When P is an improvement for x with respect to P 0, we equivalently say
that P 0 is a worsening for x with respect to P . Let wx(P ) = fP 0 2 N : P 0
is a worsening for x with respect to Pg.
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Chapter 3
MaskinMonotonicity andMaskinMonotonic
Extensions
3.1 Maskin Monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity calls for the social choice rule to satisfy the following
property: if the lower contour set of a socially optimal alternative does not
shrink for any agent, then this alternative must remain being socially optimal.
It is satised by the prominent social choice rules, which are the Pareto rule
when indeferences are not allowed, the Condorcet rule, and the Walrasian
rule. To be more precise, let us give a small argument which explains why the
Pareto rule satises Maskin monotonicity when indeferences are not allowed.
Let x 2 A be a Pareto optimal alternative with respect to preference prole
P , hence chosen by the Pareto rule under P . This means for any other
alternative y 2 A, there exists an agent i such that, x Pi y. If we replace
the preference prole P with P
0
such that for all i 2 N , xPi y implies xP 0i
y, then x P
0
i y holds, therefore x is Pareto optimal with respect to P
0
as
well, and hence it is chosen under P
0
by the Pareto rule, establising the
monotonicity of Pareto rule.
On the other hand, some well-known social choice rules do not satisfy
monotonicity. It is shown that there exists social choice problems for which
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no scoring rule is Maskin monotonic (Erdem and Sanver 2005).
We now give the formal denition of the Maskin monotonocity.
Denition 3.1 A SCR F is Maskin monotonic if and only if x 2 F (P 0) =)
x 2 F (P ) for any P , P 0 2 <N and any x 2 A with P 0 2 wx(P ).
3.2 Maskin Monotonic Extensions
Denition 3.2 Given any two SCRs F and G, we say that G is a Maskin
monotonic extension of F if and only if G(P )  F (P ) 8P 2 N while G is
Maskin-monotonic.
Let ME(F ) be the set of Maskin monotonic extensions of F . As we
mentioned, the trivial social choice correspondence is a monotonic extension
of all social choice functions, implying ME(F ) 6= ;.
Proposition 1 Given any two social choice rules F and G, if F and G are
Maskin monotonic then F \G is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Take any x 2 A and any P; P 0 2 N such that P is an improvement
for x 2 A with respect to P 0 : Let x 2 F \G (P 0) , implies x 2 F (P 0) and
x 2 G(P 0): As F and G are Maskin monotonic x 2 F (P ) and x 2 G(P );
so we have x 2 F \G (P ), showing the Maskin monotonicity of F \G:
3.3 The Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extension
Denition 3.3 The minimal Maskin monotonic extension (F ) of a SCR
F is dened by (F ) = \fG : G 2ME(F )g.
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Proposition 2 Every social choice rule F admits a unique minimal Maskin
monotonic extension (F ).
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction, there exist another minimal Maskin
monotonic extension (F ); such that (F ) 6= (F ). By Proposition 1, we
know that (F ) \ (F ) is Maskin monotonic and is also an extension of F
since (F ) and (F ) are both Maskin monotonic extensions of F: Therefore
((F ) \ (F ))  (F ) contradics with the minimality of (F ):
We now introduce a minimal Maskin monotonic extension of a social
choice rule F within a given family of social choice rules.
Denition 3.4 Let F be some family of SCRs such that 9G 2 F with
G(P ) = A 8P 2 N and given any two social choice rules F , G; if F ,
G 2 F then F \ G 2 F .Then MEF(F ) = fH 2 F : H is a Maskin
monotonic extension of Fg is the set of Maskin monotonic extensions of F
within the family F :
Remark 1 MEF(F ) 6= ;.
Denition 3.5 The minimal Maskin monotonic extension of F within the
family F is the SCR F(F ) = \fH : H 2MEF(F )g:
Proposition 3 (Sen (1995)) Every social choice rule F admits a unique
minimal Maskin monotonic extension F(F ).
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Proof. Suppose for a contradiction, there exist another minimal Maskin
monotonic extension F(F ) within the family F , such that F(F ) 6= F(F ).
By construction of F , we have F(F ) \ F(F ) 2 F and is also Maskin
monotonic extension of F within the family F . Therefore (F(F )\F(F )) 
F(F ) contradics with the minimality of F(F ):
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Chapter 4
q-Approval Fallback Bargaining
Fallback Bargaining, introduced by Brams and Kilgour (2001), is an ap-
proach to bargaining that produces a prediction about the bargaining out-
come. People are seen as beginning by insisting on their most preferred
alternatives, then falling back, in lockstep, to less preferred alternatives until
there is an alternative with su¢ cient support (i.e. majority or supermajority
support, or unanimity, as appropriate). The outcome of Fallback Bargain-
ing is a subset of alternatives called the Compromise Set, which may be
compared to the product of a social choice rule.
Fallback Bargaining has many variants. Brams and Kilgour show that
Unanimity Fallback Bargaining leads to the alternative(s) receiving unani-
mous support at the highest possible level. In Unanimity Fallback Bargain-
ing, the Compromise Set consists of exactly those alternatives that maximize
the minimum satisfaction among all people. If a decision rule other than una-
nimity is adopted, the outcome of Fallback Bargaining may be di¤erent from
the Unanimity Fallback Bargaining outcome. If preferences are strict, any
Fallback Bargaining outcome is Pareto-optimal, but need not be unique; the
Unanimity Fallback Bargaining outcome is at least middling in everybodys
ranking. Fallback Bargaining does not necessarily select a Condorcet al-
ternative, or even the rst choice of a majority of bargainers. However, it
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maximizes the satisfaction of the most dissatised individual.
For any xed number of q, where q lies between 1 and total number of
voters inclusive, q- approval rule picks the alternative(s) receiving the support
of q people at the highest possible level. And q-Approval Fallback Bargaining
picks the alternative(s) which gets the highest support among the alternatives
which are chosen by q- approval rule. Majoritarian Compromise, introduced
by Sertel (1986), and Unanimity Fallback Bargaining are particular cases of
q-Approval Fallback Bargaining when q is equal to majority and unanimity,
respectively. Moreover, q-Approval Fallback Bargaining coincides with the
plurality rule when q = 1.
Before formally dene q-Approval Fallback Bargaining, we introduce q-
approval rule which picks all the alternatives receiving the support of q people
at the highest possible level.
For any positive integer l 2 f1; :::;mg, we write sl(x;P ) = #fi 2 N :
#U(x; Pi)  lg for the l-level support of x 2 A at P 2 N, which is the
number of voters who rank x among their l best alternatives at P . For any
P 2 N and any q 2 f1; :::; ng, let l(q; P ) 2 f1; :::;mg be the smallest integer
satisfying sl(q;P )(x;P )  q for some x 2 A. So sl(x;P ) < q for all x 2 A and
for all l < l(q; P ).
Denition 4.1 Picking some q 2 f1; :::; ng, a SCR Fq is the q-approval rule
if and only if at each P 2 N; we have Fq(P ) = fx 2 A : sl(q;P )(x;P )  qg.
10
Denition 4.2 Picking some q 2 f1; :::; ng, a SCR F q is q-Approval Fall-
back Bargaining if and only if at each P 2 N; we have F q (P ) = fx 2 A :
sl(q;P )(x;P )  sl(q;P )(y;P ) 8y 2 Ag.
Remark 2 F q (P )  Fq(P ) for all P 2 N.
We illustrate that q-Approval Fallback Bargaining fails Maskin monotonic-
ity when q is equal to majority via an example:
Example 1 Let #N = 3 , A = fa; b; cg and take P; P 0 2 N as follows:
P
0
P
1 voter: a b c 1 voter: a c b
1 voter: c a b 1 voter: c a b
1 voter: b c a 1 voter: b c a
We read the prefence orderings from left to right, i.e. in prole P
0
, the
rst voters best alternative is a, and second best is b, etc.
As we can see a is chosen by q-Approval Fallback Bargaining when q is
equal to majority in prole P
0
. However, a is not selected in prole P while,
a has not deteriorated in any voters preference when passing from P
0
to P:
Remark 3 Example 1 can be extented to show that q-Approval Fallback Bar-
gaining fails Maskin monotonictiy for any q.
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Chapter 5
The Minimal Maskin Monotonic Ex-
tension of q-Approval Fallback Bar-
gaining
First, we propose some propositions to construct the minimal Maskin
monotonic extension of q-Approval Fallback Bargaining and the q-approval
rule within the family that we will dene.
For each (q; l) 2 f1; 2; :::; ngf1; 2; :::;mg, dene a mapping Fq;l : N  !
2A where for each P 2 N we have Fq;l(P ) = fx 2 A : sl(x;P )  qg. The
non-emptiness of Fq;l(P ) is not ensured. Note that we have Fq;l(P )  Fq;l0(P )
whenever l  l0. On the other hand, as Brams and Kilgour (2001) show, for
every q 2 f1; :::; ng, there exists l(q) = mq m+n
n

such that l(q;P )  l(q) for
all P 2 N.
Theorem 1 (Brams and Kilgour (2001)) : l(q) =

mq m+n
n

.
Proof. The pigeonhole principle shows that some alternative must appear at
least

nd
m

times in the rst d entries of all n rows of a preference prole .
If d > m(q 1)
n
, then nd
m
> q   1, which implies that d  l(q; P ): If m(q 1)
n
is
integral, this proves that l(q; P )  m(q 1)
n
+ 1; if not, if proves that l(q; P ) l
m(q 1)
n
m
. The conclusion now follows directly.
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Let W = f(q; l) 2 f1; 2; :::; ng  f1; 2; :::; ng : l  l(q)g.
Proposition 4 Fq;l(P ) 6= ? for all P 2 N , (q; l) 2 W .
Proof. To show the ifpart, take any (q; l) 2 W and any P 2 N. By
denition of l(q;P ), sl(q;P )(x;P )  q for some x 2 A. Hence x 2 Fq;l(q;P )(P ).
As l(q;P )  l(q) and l(q)  l by construction of W , we have l(q;P )  l,
hence x 2 Fq;l(P ), establishing Fq;l(P ) 6= ?. To show the only if part,
let (l; q) =2 W . So l < l(q). Pick m = n and let, without loss of generality,
A = fa0; a1; :::; am 1g. Consider P 2 N such that for every i 2 N we have
akmodm Pi a(kmodm)+1 8k 2 fi  1; :::; i +m  3g. By construction of P , we
have sl0(x;P ) = l0 8l0 2 f1; :::mg, 8x 2 A. Thus l(q; P ) = q. As m = n, we
have l(q) = q, implying l(q; P ) = l(q). As l < l(q), sl(x;P ) = q holds for no
x 2 A.
Now we ensure the non-emptiness of Fq;l(P ) by picking any (q; l) from
the family W .
Now we will dene two families;
Let  = fFq;lg(q;l)2W and  = fFq;l 2  : l = l(q)g.
Proposition 5 Every Fq;l 2  is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Take any Fq;l 2 , any P; P 0 2 N and any x 2 Fq;l(P ) with
P 2 wx(P 0). As x 2 Fq;l(P ), we have sl(x;P )  q. As P 2 wx(P 0), we have
sl(x;P
0)  sl(x;P ), implying sl(x;P 0)  q, hence x 2 Fq;l(P 0), establishing
the Maskin monotonicity of Fq;l.
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Proposition 6 Given any q 2 f1; 2; :::; ng and any Fq;l 2  we have,
(i) Fq(P )  Fq;l(P )  Fq;l(q)(P ) 8P 2 N =) q = q.
(ii) F q (P )  Fq;l(P )  Fq;l(q)(P ) 8P 2 N =) q = q.
Proof. As F q (P )  Fq(P ) 8P 2 N, (ii) implies (i). To show (ii), let q = n,
and consider the case q < q. Let m = 2n and n  3: Pick some x 2 A, some
K  N with #K = n 1 and construct a prole P 2 N such that F q (P ) 
Fq;l(P ), x Pi z 8z 2 A, 8i 2 K and z Pix 8z 2 A; 8i 2 NnK. As q < n 1, we
have x 2 Fq;l(P ). As m = 2n, we have l(q) = m  1; implying x =2 Fq;l(q)(P ),
giving a contradiction. Now let q 2 f1; 2; :::; n  1g. First consider the case
where q < q: Let m = n  3. Pick some x 2 A, some K  N with #K = q
and construct a prole P 2 N such that F q (P )  Fq;l(P ), x Pi z 8z 2 A,
8i 2 K and z Pix 8z 2 A; 8i 2 NnK. Note that x 2 Fq;l(P ). As q < q, if
x 2 Fq;l(q)(P ) then l(q) = m, which implies q = m, giving a contradiction.
Now consider the case where q > q. Let m = n + 1. Let, without loss
of generality A = fa1; a2; :::; an+1g. Pick some an 2 A, construct a prole
P 2 N such that F q (P ) Fq;l(P ), sl(q)+1(an;P ) = n and put all alternatives
di¤erent from an in a cycling way: each ak 2 An fangappears exactly once in
each line. As m = n+1; we have l(q) = q for any q and l(q) > l(q), implying
l  l(q) > l(q). So an 2 Fq;l(P ) while an =2 Fq;l(q)(P ), giving a contradiction.
Proposition 5 conjoined with Proposition 6 implies for any q 2 f1; 2; :::; ng
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that the minimal monotonic extension of both Fq and F q within the family
 coincides with Fq;l(q).
We state this formally below.
Theorem 2 (Fq) = (F q ) = Fq;l(q) for every q 2 f1; 2; :::; ng.
As   , Theorem 1 immediately implies the following corrollary.
Corollary 1 (Fq) = (F q ) = Fq;l(q) for every q 2 f1; 2; :::; ng.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have calculated the minimal MaskinMonotonic extension of q-Approval
Fallback Bargaining within the family ; family of compromise sets. If we
consider the minimal Maskin Monotonic extension of q-Approval Fallback
Bargaining within all social choice rules, then it fails to be a Fq;l rule for
some q 2 f1; :::; ng and l 2 f1; 2; :::;mg for all P 2 N:
We illustrate this below :
Let #N = 6 , A = fa; b; c; d; e; fg and take P 2 N as follows:
P
1 voter: a b c d e f
1 voter: b f d a c e
1 voter: c e b a d f
1 voter: d f b e c a
1 voter: e f d c b a
1 voter: f c d b a e
As Erdem and Sanver (2005) propose, for any x 2 A and P 2 N, we
have x 2 (F q (P )) when  is the family of all social choice rules if and only
if there exists some P 0 2 wx(P ) such that x 2 F q (P 0):( see proposition 3.1
16
in Erdem and Sanver (2005)). So (F

q (P )) = fb; c; fg :
Let q = 1 there exists no l such that Fq;l = fb; c; fg. That holds for any
q where 1 < q  n: So There exists no (q; l) pairs that (F q (P )) = Fq;l:
Since  can be interpreted as the family of compromise rules, it thus
appears that the minimal Maskin Monotonic extension of a specic compro-
mise rule, namely the q-Approval Fallback Bargaining , fails to be itself a
compromise rule. Hence, there might exist a trade o¤ between extending a
compromise in order to ensure Maskin Monotonicity on the one hand, and
preserving the spirit of this compromise on the other hand.
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